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Abstract
Interest groups struggle to build reputations as influential actors in the policy process and to
discern the influence exercised by others. This study conceptualizes influence reputation as a
relational variable that varies locally throughout a network. Drawing upon interviews with 168
interest group representatives in the United States health policy domain, this research
examines the effects of multiplex networks of communication, coalitions, and issues on
influence reputation. Using an exponential random graph model (ERGM), the analysis
demonstrates that multiple roles of confidant, collaborator, and issue advocate affect how
group representatives understand the influence of those with whom they are tied, after
accounting for homophily among interest groups.
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Interest group influence reputations vary locally in multiplex networks.
Gossip plays a key role in reducing uncertainty about influence reputation.
Communication, coalitions, and issue networks matter for influence reputation.
Groups play multiple roles of confidants, collaborators, and issue advocates.
Communication networks an especially strong predictor of influence reputation.
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1. Introduction
Relatively little in the American political system is accomplished purely through the
exercise of formal authority. In a system defined by multiple veto points and animated by a
swath of interested actors, most policy changes are effected by the subtleties of influence. In
this world, a reputation for influence is a valuable asset. As a result, public policy scholars have
long sought to understand the development of influence reputations and how these
reputations matter for politics (see, inter alia, Banfield, 1961; Beritelli and Laesser, 2011;
Fernandez and Gould, 1994; Gamson, 1966; Heaney, 2006; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Leifeld
and Schneider, 2012; Wolfinger, 1960).
The distribution of influence reputation is a particular concern in the world of interest
group politics (Hojnacki et al. 2012; Smith 1995). Since interest groups lack formal powers, they
depend entirely on influence in order to attain their goals. Thus, gossip about which interest
groups are influential readily flows through political networks. Research in this area stresses
the emergence of consensus about who the influentials are in a network (Laumann and Knoke,
1987: 159). This perspective leads scholars to model an interest group’s influence reputation as
a single quantity (Leifeld and Schneider, 2012; Fernandez and Gould, 1994; Heaney, 2006).
According to this view, an interest group becomes known as having a particular level of
influence within a network, which can be explained by the stable characteristics of interest
groups and their positions in political networks.
Some interest groups are indeed renowned as influential throughout a network, while
others are universally ignored as irrelevant. However, we observe that a common feature of
many reputations is that they are fragmented and varied throughout a network (Beritelli and
2

Laesser, 2011; Gondal, 2011; Lang and Lang, 1988; Price and Gioia, 2008). Any actor may have
a strong reputation in one crowd and a weaker reputation within another. Is it possible to
account for this variation using models of influence reputation?
This article argues that the embeddedness of interest groups in multiplex networks is an
important explanation for variation in interest group influence reputations. Interest groups
participate in and learn about the political process through their communication with other
groups, collaboration in coalitions, and advocacy in issue areas. As a group engages in
communication, collaboration, and issue advocacy, its performance of multiple roles is visible to
other interested observers that use this information to make judgments about the group’s
contribution (positive or negative) to policy debates. Thus, examining the multiple ways in
which interest groups are connected and disconnected helps to account for how their
representatives see and think about the community of which they are a part, as well as how
they are seen by that community.
This research is based on personal interviews conducted in 2003 with representatives of
168 interest groups working in Washington, DC on national health policy. It models influence
reputation in this network as a function of three overlapping networks (Communication,
Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap) using the exponential random graph model (ERGM)
approach, controlling for homophily among interest groups. The results show that who cites
whom as influential depends, in part, on connections through these networks. The article
concludes by discussing the implications of these results for interest group politics and by
suggesting future research on multiplexity, reputation, and dynamics in political networks.
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2. The Nature of Influence Reputation
Interest group representatives want to know which actors exert influence over the
policy process, but they are uncertain about which actors actually exert influence. This
uncertainty exists because of incomplete information, causal complexity, and the large volume
of activities in the policy process. First, uncertainty due to incomplete information exists
because much of the relevant action in the policy process takes place behind the scenes
(Birnbaum, 1992; Birnbaum and Murray, 1987). Lobbyists meet privately (or semi‐privately)
with policy makers to frame policy arguments, demonstrate grassroots relevance, offer
inducements, and occasionally make threats. Stories of what happens in these meetings
sometimes leak to a broader audience. But, since no one can know exactly what is said and
done in all these situations, it is hard to be certain about who is wielding influence effectively
and who is not.
Second, uncertainty due to causal complexity exists because there are many actors in
the policy process and many potential paths to influence. Just because an actor supported (or
opposed) a policy that was ultimately enacted (or defeated) does not mean that the actor was a
root cause of the outcome (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957). Policy outcomes may be
caused by institutional rules, demographic changes, critical events, or any of a number of
factors that extend beyond the actions of any one actor (Patashnik, 2008). Policy is made
through the complex interaction of executive branch officials, legislators, interest groups, think
tanks, media, citizens, and other actors (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Even if an interest group
appears to exert influence over policy, it is difficult to know whether it is, in fact, a root cause of
a particular policy outcome.
4

Third, even if interest group representatives were to have complete information about a
set of actors and understood perfectly the causal processes that lead them to influence the
policy process or not, they would possess uncertainties about influence due to the large volume
of actors and events in the policy arena. In recent years, approximately 10,000 bills have been
introduced in each two‐year session of Congress (Tauberer, 2011). In 2011, there were 12,633
registered lobbyists in Washington, DC (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012). It is impossible
for anyone to follow it all. Thus, as interest group representatives may have confidence about
the nature of influence possessed by some, but not all, of the other actors in policy process.
Interest group representatives want to reduce their uncertainty about who is influential.
Knowledge about influence helps them to better anticipate outcomes in the policy process and
to strategically calibrate their responses to emerging events (Krackhardt, 1990; Simpson et al.,
2011). For example, if an actor is believed to be influential, then its actions (or inactions) might
be viewed as likely to prompt policy change (or stasis); if the actor supports a proposed policy,
that policy might have a greater chance of moving forward; if the actor fails to support a
proposed policy, then that policy might have a lesser chance of success. Interest group
representatives may rely on these expectations, in part, to determine whether they should
guide their group’s resources toward attempting to support or block the proposed policy.
To reduce their uncertainty about influence, interest group representatives continually
gossip about who is influential (Burt 2005; Dunbar, 2004; Ellwardt et al., 2012). Much of this
gossip takes place in private conversations among lobbyists, in coalitions, in issue forums, and
in other opportunities to connect with participants in the policy process. Gossip is facilitated by
a wide range of specialized publications that follow the policy process with an insider
5

perspective, such as National Journal Daily, Roll Call, The Hill, and Politico, as well as policy‐
area‐specific forums, such as the Daily Health Policy Report. From this gossip, reputations are
born. Political actors then use reputation as an information shortcut in making judgments
about influence.
Since reputations spread through gossip, they diffuse unevenly through networks.
Some interest groups are nearly universally renowned as being influential. For example, the
National Rifle Association, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the United States
Chamber of Commerce are widely known to be influential, even by those who are not close
observers of politics. However, other organizations build their reputations for influence in
more limited social circles (Gondal, 2011). This continuum from peer recognition to universal
renown is a common pattern in reputational systems (Lang and Lang, 1988). Empirical studies
have demonstrated this pattern in diverse phenomena from tourism (Beritelli and Laesser,
2011) to corporate image management (Price and Gioia, 2008).
It is not necessary to make strong claims about the extent to which reputations are
“deserved”; that is, do “truly influential” actors have strong reputations for influence while,
“truly non‐influential” actors have weak reputations for influence? Reputations are sometimes
well deserved and at other times are undeserved. Sometimes influential actors are recognized
and respected, while at other times they remain undetected behind the scenes. Sometimes
non‐influential actors are summarily dismissed, while at other times they are mistakenly
thought to be important players. At minimum, there is a loose linkage between reputation and
actual influence (Galaskiewicz, 1979; Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz 1977: 626; Weible
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2005).1 As long as such a linkage exists, policy actors will seek out more reliable gossip and
attempt to make inferences from this noisy signal.
As long as reputations are assumed by policy actors to contain an element of truth, then
reputations serve as a resource for those that possess them (Gamson, 1966). As Philip Leifield
and Volker Schneider (2012: 3) note, “perceived influence of a potential alter is a sign of high
quality, either in terms of its information potential or as a powerful ally” (see also Smith, 1995;
Weible, 2005). If Actor A believes that Actor B is influential, then B may have a greater
likelihood of soliciting A’s cooperation on a range of projects. That is, A may behave “as if” B is
influential (Wedeen, 1998: 519). Thus, B may be able to translate its influence reputation –
imperfectly and incompletely – into actual influence. These mechanisms make the distribution
of influence reputation a worthy subject of scholarly inquiry, just as it is frequently the object of
interest group attention.

3. A Theory of Multiplex Networks and Influence Reputation
Multiplex networks exist when actors are connected through more than one type of
socially relevant tie (White, 2008: 38). In a multiplex network, different ties reflect the diverse
roles played by participants in the network. For example, a set of adult friends may have ties
that can be classified as kin, neighbor, and/or coworker (Verbrugge, 1979). Or, a set of
coworkers may have ties that can be classified as authority relations, friendship, and/or
exchange of advice (Krackhardt, 1992). Multiplex networks are particularly consequential when
1

Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) make a similar point in another empirical context in their analysis of
young, venture‐capital‐backed biotechnology firms. They show that start‐up firms that receive endorsements from
prominent exchange partners experience a kind of “interorganizational certification” that enables them to
outperform their competitors. List (2006) also demonstrates the effect of reputation in influencing actual
decisions in laboratory and field experiments in the market for sports cards.
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they overlap and interact to create processes that cannot be explained by a single network
alone. Along these lines, previous research demonstrates that multiplexity is critical to diverse
phenomena, such as the mobilization of social movements (Gould, 1991), the consolidation of
political power (Padgett and Ansell, 1993), the emergence of trust in economic relationships
(Granovetter, 1985), the creation of social bonds within civic networks (Baldassarri and Diani,
2007), and the organization of party coalitions (Grossman and Dominguez, 2009).
The principal argument of this article is that multiplex networks are critical for interest
group representatives as they resolve uncertainty about which other interest groups are
influential in the policy process. This argument is based on two premises. First, when interest
groups are connected with one another in multiplex networks, they are more likely to receive
information about one another than they are to receive information about those from whom
they are disconnected. These connections enable interest group representatives to learn about
the behind‐the‐scenes actions of their alters, which reduces uncertainty about their alters’
degree of influence. Thus, interest group representatives may be more likely think of their
alters as influential than to think of those with whom they are not tied as influential.
Second, interest groups are connected with myriad other actors in the policy process. A
challenge they face is how to sort through these connections to determine which ones are
genuinely important. The overlapping connections provided by multiplex networks create
redundancies that help to reduce uncertainties about influence (Landau, 1969). Information
that travels through multiple paths may be more likely to be trusted than information that
comes only from a single source (Grannovetter, 1985), thus reducing uncertainty. Further,
multiplex networks represent the conflux of multiple role structures (Padgett and Powell,
8

2012), so multiplexity reduces uncertainty by allowing ego to see the actions of its alters across
multiple roles. As a result, interest groups may be more likely to think of those with whom they
have multiple connections as influential than to think of those with whom they have one or
zero connections.
I argue that there are three types of networks that are especially important in shaping
the way that interest group representatives think about influence: Communication networks,
Coalition Overlap networks, and Issue Overlap networks. These networks reflect the distinct,
but overlapping, roles that interest groups play as confidants, collaborators, and issue
advocates. First, Communication networks provide the channels through which gossip flows.
Communication network ties exist when interest group representatives confide directly with
one another in person or through electronic media, such as telephones or e‐mail. The nature
and speed of information diffusion in these networks depends on the strength of ties between
actors (Granovetter, 1973). Interaction in these networks has the potential to breed familiarity
and trust (Carpenter et al., 2003, 2004). As trust builds, communication partners may assume
the role of confidants, thus allowing more sensitive and valuable information to pass through
the network (Krackhardt, 1992). I expect that interest group representatives are less uncertain
about the activities of those who they confide regularly, giving them a more precise estimate of
the influence of these alters. With a more precise estimate of influence, representatives are
more likely to indicate that an alter is influential when it is, in fact, influential. Hence, this
research tests the hypothesis that the likelihood that an interest group representative thinks of
another group as influential increases as the strength of its contact with that group in
Communication networks increases.
9

Beyond the ad hoc, direct relationships that interest groups form in Communication
networks, lobbying coalitions are a routine way for interest groups to collaborate when they
share interests with other groups (Hojnacki, 1998; Holyoke, 2011; Hula 1999; Loomis, 1986;
Nelson and Yackee, 2012). A lobbying coalition exists whenever two or more interest groups
explicitly decide to collaborate in advocating for a policy position on which they mutually
agree.2 By joining coalitions and assuming the role of collaborator, interest groups expose their
inner workings to their coalition partners. I argue that the overlapping memberships created by
participation in these coalitions form a second important network among interest groups,
which I call Coalition Overlap networks.
Coalition Overlap network ties exist when two interest groups share membership in at
least one lobbying coalition. Some interest groups join numerous coalitions on a wide range of
issues, while some interest groups join few (if any) coalitions (Hojnacki, 1997). The strength of
overlapping ties in these networks vary depending on the number of coalitions that the two
interest groups have in common. Conceptualizing networks in this way – based on common
group affiliation – is a long‐standing practice in the networks field, beginning with Breiger’s
(1974) classic examination of eighteen southern women who attended fourteen parties.
Applications of affiliation networks to political questions include Porter et al.’s (2005) analysis
of committee co‐memberships in the U.S. House of Representatives, Fowler’s (2006) study of
2

Readers familiar with the European political context may be inclined to prefer a slightly broader
definition of the concept of “coalition,” perhaps including cases where groups are on the same side of an issue, but
do not coordinate their work directly with one another. The definition that I am using, however, is consistent with
its use in the American political context. See Mahoney (2008) for an excellent analysis of the differences between
the ways that coalitions work in the United States versus Europe. In particular, coalitions are relied on more
frequently in the United States and tend to be comparably more professionalized there. Of course, this
observation in not intended to imply that the organizational structures of coalitions are homogenous in the United
States. Indeed, coalitions may be small or larger, hierarchical or decentralized, formal or informal, or vary
structurally in any number of ways.
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legislative bill co‐sponsorship, Heaney and Rojas’s (2007) model of mobilization by antiwar
activists, Grossman and Dominguez’s (2009) exploration of common interest group
endorsements of electoral candidates, and Murdie and Davis’s (2011) mapping of common
issue activity by international nongovernmental organizations.
Because Coalition Overlap networks are based on affiliations, rather than on direct
contacts between groups, they require a different interpretation than do communication
networks. Coalitional collaboration often brings groups into close contact with one another,
though some coalitional relationships are arms‐length partnerships where some interest groups
extend their name and support to the coalition without necessarily becoming involved in its
day‐to‐day operations (Hula, 1999). Members of a coalition need not interact with one
another directly, especially if the size of the coalition is large or if its organizational structure is
hierarchical in nature. Thus, being tied to another interest group through coalition overlap
reduces uncertainty about influence reputation differently than do ties in communication
networks.
Actor A’s judgments about its coalition partner, Actor B, may be formed in the absence
of any direct interaction between A and B. Coalition overlap allows interest groups to observe
whether their collaborators attempt to set the coalition’s agenda, the extent to which they
contribute to its work, and whether their partners get in their way or not. Through coalition
meetings, e‐mail listservs, and publicly‐staged events, interest group representatives observe
their partners’ actions or inactions in coalition settings. Further, coalitions create an
institutional setting for interest group representatives to gossip about their collaborators. If
Actors A, B, and C are in a coalition together, then A may form its judgments about B, in part,
11

through gossiping with C about B. Such opportunities are more plentiful as the number of
coalitions that A and B have in common expands. Hence, this research tests the hypothesis
that the likelihood that an interest group representative thinks of another group as influential
increases as the number of coalition memberships that they have in common increases.
A third way that interest groups are networked with one another is through common
involvement in the same issue areas, which I call Issue Overlap networks. Two interest groups
are tied in an issue overlap network when they work on at least one issue in common. These
network ties become stronger as the number of common issues rises. Like Coalition Overlap
networks, Issue Overlap networks are affiliation networks – as described by Breiger (1974) – so
they also require a different interpretation than is provided for Communication networks.
Interest groups that are linked in Issue Overlap networks may communicate directly
with one another and work together on policy issues, but it is also possible that they neither
communicate directly with one another nor work on the same side of an issue. Indeed, interest
groups that are linked in an Issue Overlap network may be adversaries on an issue. Yet, issues
serve as a common basis for interest groups to establish niches and forge distinct identities
(Browne, 1990; Heaney, 2004). Issue‐oriented policy communities promote opportunities for
information sharing within issue areas, such as policy conferences, electronic bulletin boards,
and issue‐focused periodicals. As a result, interest groups are able to closely monitor both
allies and adversaries in their roles as issue advocates when then have overlapping issue niches.
These processes give rise to “issue networks,” as Hugh Helco (1978) noted more than three
decades ago, in which the participants acquire known reputations based on their involvement
in issues.
12

I argue that as the number of overlapping issues between two groups increases, issue‐
based monitoring reduces the amount of uncertainty than interest groups have about one
another’s influence. Thus, this research tests the hypothesis that when two interest groups
have a greater number of overlapping issues in common, then they are more likely to observe
one another as active in issue‐based communities and, consequently, to think of each other as
influential than when they have fewer overlapping issues in common.
A fundamental premise underlying the hypotheses advanced here – that interest groups
that are more closely connected in multiplex networks have less uncertainty about one
another’s influence levels – may appear to be at odds with other scholarship on the subject of
multiplexity. Most notably, John Padgett and Christopher Ansell (1993) contend that the
presence of multiplex networks increases uncertainty of strategic actors engaged in “robust
action.” However, the appearance of difference is engendered by distinctions in the cases at
hand. The present study examines the uncertainty with which egos make assessments in ability
of alters to influence a system, whereas Padgett and Ansell examine uncertainty about exactly
which moves alters will make. But, both perspectives may hold simultaneously: multiplexity
may reduce uncertainty about the fact that an alter is influential, while at the same time raising
uncertainty about how exactly the alter will wield that influence. Hence, it is important to
underscore that the hypotheses tested here apply to the relationship between multiplexity and
influence reputation. Multiplexity may have different kinds of effects on other political
phenomena.
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4. Homophily as an Alternative Explantion
In order to assess the importance of multiplex networks in shaping influence
reputations, it is essential to account for alternative explanations for how actors think about
influence. Perhaps the most important alternative explanation is homophily, which is the idea
that actors form social ties with one another when they are similar in important ways (Heaney
et al. 2012; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012; McPherson et al., 2001). While interest group
representatives may draw upon interaction in multiplex networks when forming impressions of
influence, it is also possible that they look to those that are similar to themselves in important
respects and assume that those actors are influential, irrespective of who they interact with.
Actors use these kinds of comparisons to make sense of their working environments (Lawrence,
2006). For example, when two interest groups have the same organizational form – perhaps
they are both trade associations or citizens advocacy groups – then their representatives better
understand each other’s missions, governance, and methods of advocacy because of their
isomorphism with one another (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As interest group representatives
understand one another better, they may be more likely to cite one another as influential,
irrespective of who they interact with. Failure to consider homophily may lead analysts to
overestimate social influence effects in network data (Fowler et al., 2011; Noel and Nyhan,
2011).
It is important to recognize that homophily offers an explanation fundamentally
different than multiplexity for interest groups’ assessments. Homophily assumes that ego’s
assessments are based on alter’s individual qualities, not based on the shared relationship
between ego and alter. Multiplexity assumes, however, that ego assesses alter’s influence by
14

observing alter’s performance of three roles (confidant, collaborator, and issue advocate)
because of shared network ties.
In order to account for homophily in the formation of interest group reputation, I
hypothesize that interest group representatives are more likely to think of other groups as
influential when those groups share significant political characteristics with the representative’s
organization. These characteristics include organizational type, partisanship, significant
lobbying expenditures, campaign spending through Political Action Committees, independent
expenditures, and office location, all of which have been associated with levels of interest
group influence in previous research (Heaney 2006).

5. Research Design
In order to understand influence reputation, this study focuses on networks among
interest groups in the U.S. health policy domain. The data are drawn from interviews
conducted by the author in 2003. Focusing on a single policy domain ensures that the major
actors in question are connected within a common network. Addressing health policy, in
particular, allows analysis of a broad field of diverse actors from multiple ideological points of
view and substantive foci. Indeed, the health policy domain contains issues that have high
salience (e.g., universal health insurance) and low salience (e.g., the scope of practice for nurse
anesthetists), as well as issues that are highly partisan (e.g., the creation tax‐exempt health
savings accounts) and bipartisan/nonpartisan (e.g., funding for medical research on Alzheimer’s
disease). Active participants in the domain include unions, veterans’ organizations, citizens’
groups, professional societies, trade associations, associations of government officials, think
15

tanks, foundations, and other interests that may have some role in the production,
consumption, financing, and/or regulation of health care. The breadth and complexity of the
health policy domain ensures that the research reflects the forces active in American politics
generally, even though health policy is not a typical domain. In particular, health politics are
more amenable to redistributive arguments and moral claims than are politics in other
domains, and bureaucratic agencies are more engaged in the administration of health policies
than they are in other policy areas (Carpenter 2012).
Since a wide variety of interest groups have some involvement in health policy debates,
a challenge of the research design was to select a diverse set of interest groups that would be
large enough to include the major players in all key debates, but small enough to be included in
a single study. An important practical constraint on the size of the sample selected was that a
representative from each interest group would be shown a complete list of all the interest
groups in the study. The list must be short enough that representatives can review the names
of all interest groups within a few minutes.
Following the approach to boundary specification recommended by Laumann et al.
(1989), the most active interest groups in the network were determined based on four sources.
First, the federal lobbying reports of interest groups were examined if they indicated that the
interest group lobbied on health care, Medicare and Medicaid, or medical research issues from
1997 to 2002 (U.S. Senate, Office of Public Records, 2002). Interest groups from this list were
ranked based on their reported federal lobbying expenditures. Second, interest groups were
ranked based on the number of times that they testified at health‐policy‐related hearings on
Capitol Hill from 1997 to 2002 (LexisNexis, 2002). Any interest group that ranked among the
16

top 50 groups on either of the first two lists, or among the top 100 groups on both lists, was
included in the study. Third, interest groups with a long history of involvement in health policy
debates were considered by including all interest groups that appeared in Laumann and
Knoke’s (1987) study of the health policy domain. Fourth, a preliminary list of interest groups,
which was compiled based on the first three sources, was circulated to a panel of experts from
academia and the policy world to solicit additional recommendations. Any interest group
recommended by at least two experts was included in the study. This procedure led to the
identification of 171 interest groups as the “most active” groups in the health policy domain.
Representatives of each of the 171 interest groups were contacted in 2003 to request
an anonymous interview. High‐level representatives from 168 of these groups were ultimately
interviewed, which constitutes the sample for the statistical analysis reported in this article.
The majority of interviews were conducted with representatives holding the title of “Director of
Governmental Affairs” (or equivalent), though some interviews were conducted with higher‐
level representatives (e.g., Executive Director, Vice President) or lower‐level representatives
(e.g., Assistant Director of Congressional Affairs). Interviews were conducted in person for 163
interest groups and by telephone for 5 groups. A premium was placed on conducting
interviews in person with high‐level actors in order to ensure the collection of quality data on
influence reputation and network ties.
Network data on Influence, Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap were
derived by combining interviews and archival data sources. Interview questions were adapted
from the interview instrument implemented by Lauman and Knoke (1987: 413‐500). The
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definitions, interview questions, and sources for each of these networks are reported in Table
1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

6. Data
Implementation of the research design outlined in the previous section led to the
collection of data on four networks with varied structures. The properties of these networks,
reported in Table 2, depend both upon their empirical structures, as well as how the networks
are defined and measured. Two of the networks are directed (Influence and Communication),
while the other two are undirected (Coalition Overlap and Issue Overlap). Three of the
networks are valued (Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap), while one is binary
(Influence). Influence has the lowest mean degree (20.429), the lowest density (0.121), and
highest centralization (0.113) in the set, reflecting the fact that interest group representatives
are relatively reserved in terms of who they name as influential actors. In contrast, Issue
Overlap has the highest mean degree (127.357), highest density (0.757), and the lowest
centralization (0.002), reflecting the fact that about three‐fourths of the interest groups have at
least one issue in common with one another. Significant variation in this network comes from
the edge values, which represent the number of issues that interest group dyads have in
common. On average, an interest group dyad has 2.573 issues in common, varying from 0 to 15
common issues (=2.527). Communication and Coalition Overlap are moderately more dense,
have higher degree, and are less centralized than Influence, though they are closer to the
Influence network on these measures than to the Issue Overlap network. Both Communication
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and Coalition Overlap have valued edges, which are an especially important aspect of variation
in the Coalition Overlap network.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The principal phenomenon of interest in this article is the citation pattern in the
Influence network, which is graphed in Figure 1a. This network has a core‐periphery structure,
with the most influential interest groups positioned toward the center of the network and the
least influential groups positioned toward the periphery. A clearer understanding of this
network can be gained by examining the influence citations received by two exemplar nodes.
Figure 1b reports the citations received by one of the leading actors in the network. This actor
has a reputation for influence that cascades throughout the network such that most other
actors cite it as influential. This actor is cited as influential by friends and enemies alike; by
those with which it works closely and by those with which it has no relationship. In contrast,
Figure 1c reports the citations received by an actor with a narrower influence reputation. Not
only does it receive fewer citations than the leading actor (which is true by definition), but its
citations come from other actors that are close to it in the network. It has built a local
reputation for influence. Some of the other interest groups with which it is connected see it as
influential, but it is not known as important beyond this community.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
While both the leading actor (Figure 1b) and the locally influential actor (Figure 1c)
networks are ideal‐typical examples, the citation patterns in the Influence network overall tend
to look more like Figure 1c than like Figure 1b. That is, the Influence network tends to be
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composed of more interest groups with local influence reputations than groups with global
influence reputations (Gondal, 2011).
If influence reputations develop locally, then information on local social structures are
important to understand patterns of influence. Gossip is a key mechanism that helps to create
these local structures. As participants in the network gossip about their assessments of
influence – for example, which interest group made all the difference in passing a recent bill or
which group is all talk and no action – these assessments become correlated with the network
structure. Examining the multiple overlapping networks in which interest groups are
embedded helps to reveal these network structures.
In order to begin to understand the relationships among these overlapping networks,
the correlations among them were calculated using the Quadratic Assignment Procedure
(Krackhardt, 1987) and are reported in Table 3. The results show that the Influence network is
significantly correlated with each of the other three networks, with the highest correlation
existing with the Communication network (0.140). Each of the other networks is correlated
with the others, with the highest correlation existing between Communication and Coalition
Overlap (0.367). Given the significant, positive correlations among Communication, Coalition
Overlap, and Issue Overlap, it is possible that these correlations may partially suppress the
relationships between these networks and the influence network in the ERGM below.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Further understanding of these overlapping structures can be discerned by calculating
concordance in citations across networks. The first part of Table 4 reports the conditional
probability that if an interest group dyad is tied in one network that it is also tied in another
20

network. The first column of Table 4 indicates that if A cites B in the Communication network
then there is a 0.210 probability that A also cites B in the Influence network. If A is tied with B
in the Coalition Overlap network, then there is a 0.163 probability that A cites B in the Influence
network. If A is tied with B in the Issue Overlap network, then there is a 0.133 probability that
A cites B in the Influence network. The second, third, and fourth columns of the table similarly
reflect conditional probabilities that A and B are tied in the Communication, Coalition Overlap,
and Issue Overlap networks. These probabilities are increasing from left to right because the
density of the reported networks is increasing from left to right. These results underscore the
local patterns of reputation in the network. If an interest group is tied with another in the
Communication, Coalition Overlap, and/or Issue Overlap network, then there is a high
probability that the interest group’s representative cites that alter in the Influence network.
The second part of Table 2 reports the higher‐order concordance of Communication,
Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap with Influence. The table contains conditional probabilities
that if an interest group dyad is tied in two or three networks then it is also tied in the Influence
network. Consistent with the expectation that increased overlap in multiplex networks reduces
uncertainty about influence, the probability of concordance with influence is higher in cases
where dyads have at least two ties in common than when they have at least one tie in common.
Finally, the highest probability of concordance with influence occurs when the dyad is tied in all
three networks. Specifically, if A is tied with B in all three networks for Communication,
Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap, then there is a 0.237 probability that A cites B in the
Influence network.
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To visualize these overlapping networks, a random sample of 25 nodes from the
Influence network is graphed in Figure 2. Only Influence citations (red lines) are graphed in
Figure 2a and only Communication citations (blue lines) are graphed in Figure 2b. The overlap
between these two networks is visualized in Figure 3c. The black lines represent dyads in which
both Influence citations and Communication citations were reported. Clearly, Influence and
Communication do not perfectly predict one another. Yet, the graph indicates a significant
tendency for actors to cite as influential the other actors with whom they communicate.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
In addition to collecting network data, I compiled data on several interest group
attributes to account for the possibility that interest groups cite one another as influential if
they share important characteristics. First, I classified the groups in the study based on eight
mutually exclusive organizational types: academic organizations (5.35%), citizens’ advocacy
organizations (21.43%), associations of government officials (4.76%), nonmember advocacy
organizations and foundations (5.95%), professional societies (27.38%), trade associations
(27.38%), labor unions (4.76%), and veterans organizations (2.98%). The variable Same
Organizational Type takes the value of 1 if two interest groups match on this variable, 0
otherwise. Second, I determined the partisanship of groups based on interviews with 95
congressional staff (48 Republicans and 46 Democrats, proportionately split based on control of
Congress in 2003). On average, interest groups had about one (0.940) more regular, reliable
lobbying tie with Republicans than with Democrats. Interest groups varied from having 16
more ties with Democrats to having 17 more ties with Republicans (=4.997). The variable
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Similar Partisan Ties takes the value of 1 if two interest groups were within three points of one
another on this measure, 0 otherwise.
A third measure of similarity is the organization’s level of lobbying activity.
Approximately one quarter (23.67%) of the interest groups in this study reported spending one
million dollars or more on lobbying in 2003 (U.S. Senate, Office of Public Records, 2003). The
variable Similar Lobbying Activity takes the value of 1 if the two groups both spent a million
dollars or more on lobbying in 2003, 0 otherwise. Fourth, 40.24% of interest groups in the
study made expenditures through a political action committee (PAC) in 2001‐2002 (Center for
Responsive Politics, 2003). The variable Both Have PAC takes the value of 1 if the two groups
both made PAC expenditures in 2001‐2002, 0 otherwise. Fifth, 8.88% of interest groups in the
study made independent expenditures in political campaigns in 2000 (Goldstein et al., 2002).
The variable Both Make Independent Expenditures takes the value of 1 if the two groups made
independent expenditures in 2000, 0 otherwise. Sixth, 52.07% of interest groups in the study
had offices in the downtown area of Washington, DC (colloquially referred to as “K Street”).
The variable Both Have Downtown Office takes the value of 1 if the two groups both had a
downtown office, 0 otherwise.
In order to obtain a more systematic understanding of the relationship between these
overlapping tendencies and interest group characteristics, it is necessary to develop a statistical
model that predicts the local patterns of citation observed in the Influence network using data
from each of the relevant political networks and shared interest group attributes. The next
section introduces the ERGM approach, which yields a model that meets this objective.
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7. An Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM)
The ERGM approach to network analysis treats the ties in a network as a random
variable to be explained by a statistical model. The “core statistical challenge” of the ERGM
approach is to model the dependence among these ties based on the specifications of the
modeler (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011: 66). Conditional dependence exists when the
possibility of forming a tie between actor A and actor B is affected by the presence or absence
of a tie between A or B and a third actor, C (Frank and Strauss, 1986). For example, the
possibility that two interest groups may enter into a coalition arrangement with one another
depends on the coalitional arrangements that these two actors have already formed. If the two
groups are already aligned with competitors of one another, then it may be difficult to forge a
coalition. However, if they are aligned with other friendly groups, then a coalition may be
cemented more easily. Beyond conditional dependence, more complex dependence structures
may be present in the data. Ties may be dependent on one another because of structural
properties of a network such as density, reciprocity, transitivity, or edgewise shared partners
(Robins et al., 2007; Snijders et al., 2006). The principal advantage of the ERGM approach is its
ability to specify these complex dependencies in a statistical model by using both endogenous
and exogenous parameters.
This article develops and tests an ERGM for the Influence network. Several endogenous
parameters are selected to model dependencies in the network so that the functional form of
the ERGM matches the underlying structure of the network data. First, a parameter for edges
is included to account for the density of the Influence network. This parameter ensures that
the estimated model produces networks with a density equal to the observed density in the
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Influence network; it is the analog of a regression constant term and is a standard parameter in
an ERGM. Second, two parameters are included to account for relationships with either one or
two edgewise shared partners. These configurations are included in the model because gossip
about influence spreads through locally proximate actors, thus engendering network
dependencies in influence citations. Entering these parameters ensure that the estimated
model produces networks with one‐ or two‐edgewise‐shared‐partner configurations equivalent
to what is observed in the Influence network.
Parameters are included in the model for the indegree and outdegree of each ego.
Including these parameters in the model ensures that the degree distribution in the estimated
ERGM replicate the degree distribution in the population. The indegree parameter accounts for
the overall level of influence reputation for each interest group in the network. It allows for the
possibility that information about high‐influence groups flows through the network differently
than information about low‐influence groups; perhaps information about high‐influence groups
cascades, while information about low‐information groups does not. Thus, an ERGM specified
to include this parameter does not explain why interest groups attain the level of influence
reputation that they do – this level is assumed by the model. Rather, it explains why an interest
group receives citations from particular other actors, given a fixed level of influence reputation.
The outdegree parameter accounts for the different thresholds that respondents use in
judging influence. The inclusion of this parameter is important because different respondents
may operate with different mental models of policy influence or may understand the interview
question about influence differently (Wolfinger, 1960). Thus, an ERGM specified to include this
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parameter explains why respondents allocate their influence citations the way that they do,
given their propensity for designating actors as influential or not.3
Six ERGMs were estimated that include different combinations of exogenous and
endogenous parameters. The Baseline Model (1) includes the six homophily variables and the
five endogenous parameters described above. Models (2) through (4) include the parameters
from the Baseline Model plus one of the networks described above (Communication, Coalition
Overlap, or Issue Overlap). These models allow the evaluation of the direct effects of each of
the networks of interest on Influence, separate from the potential confounding effects of
multicollinearity resulting from positive correlations among these three networks. Model (5)
includes all three networks of interest, the six homophily variables, as well as parameters for
edges and one and two edgewise shared partners. This model explicitly excludes indegree and
outdegree parameters in order to evaluate the extent to which these parameters affect the
substantive conclusions drawn from the results. Model (6) is the Multiplex Full Model, which
includes the Baseline Model plus all three networks and the five endogenous parameters.
These models are estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation
technique (Snijders, 2002).
The results of the ERGM estimation are reported in Table 5. For each model and
parameter, the table reports the estimated coefficient, (standard error), and [MCMC standard
error]. The Baseline Model (1) demonstrates that homophily is a potentially important
explanation for the observed pattern of citations in the Influence network. The results indicate
3

In developing the models reported in this article, I experimented with a variety of endogenous
parameters, such as parameters for a geometrically weighted degree distribution, a geometrically weighted
edgewise shared partner distribution, mutuality, reciprocity, and transitivity. However, I found that these
parameters did not provide a good fit for the Influence network.
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that interest group representatives are likely to cite as influential other groups that share the
same organizational type and substantial expenditures on lobbying. These results also contain
the counterintuitive finding that interest groups with PACs are less likely to cite as influential
other organizations with PAC, other things equal.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Models (2) through (4) demonstrate that the Communication, Coalition Overlap, and
Issue Overlap networks each explain citations in the Influence network when they are included
in the analysis one at a time. In each of these models, Same Organizational Type and Similar
Lobbying Activity have positive, statistically significant coefficients, as is the case in Model (1).
The variable Both Have PAC does not have the unexpected negative, statistically significant
coefficient that appears in Model (1).
Models (5) and (6) simultaneously include Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue
Overlap networks in the analysis. Both of these models yield positive, statistically significant
coefficients for all three networks. There are some differences between the two models
regarding differences in the homophily control variables. Model (5), which does not include the
indegree and outdegree parameters, produces statistically significant coefficients for Similar
Partisan Ties (negative), Similar Lobbying Activity (positive), Both Have PAC (positive), Both
Make Independent Expenditures (positive), and Both Have Downtown Office (positive). Model
(6), which includes the indegree and outdegree parameters, produces statistically significant
coefficients for Same Organizational Type (positive), Similar Lobbying Activity (positive), and
Both Have PAC (negative).
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Comparisons can be made across models using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
in order to determine which model is the best in explaining the observed pattern in the
Influence network. The BIC allows the evaluation of improvements in a model after adding new
variables while compensating for the fact that adding new variables may affect the likelihood of
a model by overfitting alone (Schwarz, 1978). BIC statistics are reported at the bottom of Table
5. The Baseline Model (1) has a BIC of 13,570, which can be used as a reference point against
which to compare Models (2) through (6). Each of Models (2), (3), and (4) offers a reduction of
the BIC over Model (1), indicating the superiority of models including networks over the
Baseline model. Model (2), which includes the Communication network, has the lowest BIC
(13,479) in this subset. Model (5), which includes all three networks but does not include
indegree and outdegree parameters, has the highest BIC (19,201) in the set. Finally, the
Multiplex Full Model (6) has the lowest BIC (13,471), suggesting that it is superior to the other
models considered in this analysis.
A direct comparison of Models (1) and (6) allows an overall assessment of homophily
versus multiplexity as determinants of interest group influence reputation. The results show
that the two types of explanations do not compete with one another in a statistical sense. That
is, the pattern of significant and insignificant coefficients reported in Model (1) is unchanged in
Model (6) when the three network variables enter the equation. Thus, it is consistent with the
data to say that both homophily and multiplexity are explanations for the development of
influence reputation.
Beyond examining the statistical significance of individual parameters and the BIC
statistics, it is also important to examine the overall goodness of fit of the model. To do so, the
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observed data in the Influence network are plotted against the model simulations for four
structural characteristics of the network (indegree, outdegree, edgewise shared partners, and
triad census), as recommended by Hunter et al. (2008; see also Goodreau et al., 2009). The
plots for the Multiplex Full Model (6) are reported in Figure 3. The results indicate that the
simulated model provides a very good representation of the observed data, though the fit is not
perfect. Almost all of the observed data points, indicated by the dark black line, fall within the
95 percent confidence interval of the simulations, indicated by the gray lines. The fit of the
model could be improved slightly by including parameters for specific degree values (e.g.,
degree=0). However, such an approach would surely overfit the model to the data. Thus, it is
reasonable to have confidence that the Multiplex Full Model (6) generates estimates that well
reflect key structural features of the observed network. This analysis validates the choice of the
functional form indicated by the endogenous parameters in the model.
The question naturally arises regarding the extent to which the substantive conclusions
drawn from the ERGMs are a function of the ERGM methodology itself and how much they are
a function of the empirical relationships in the data. One way to evaluate this possibility is to
compare the ERGM estimates to those obtained using the Double Semi‐Partialing Multiple
Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) (Dekker et al., 2007). Notable
similarities and differences are present in the MRQAP and ERGM procedures. Both procedures
address the network autocorrelation problem using randomization. However, ERGM explicitly
models the endogenous structure of networks, while MRQAP does not. Also, ERGM allows the
inclusion of valued edges in analysis, while MRQAP is limited to dichotomous edges only.
Nonetheless, the substantive conclusions drawn from these approaches ought to be generally
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similar if the estimated models are good reflections of the empirical processes under
examination.
Five models are estimated using MRQAP and reported in Table 6. Model (7) is an
MRQAP version of the Baseline Model, excluding the endogenous parameters and edge values.
Models (8), (9), and (10) mirror Models (2), (3), and (4), similarly excluding parameters and
edge values. Model (11) matches Models (5) and (6), following the same exclusions as in
Models (7) through (10). The results establish that there are no substantive differences among
any of the models regarding the direction or significance of the network variables,
Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap. While there are some differences
exhibited in the pattern of significance displayed in the homophily control variables, these do
not affect the conclusions drawn about the importance of multiplexity in these networks.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
The ERGM and MRQAP analysis strongly supports the theory of multiplex networks and
interest group influence reputation advanced in this article. The coefficients on all networks
variables included in Models (2) through (6) and Models (8) through (11) are statistically
significant and positive. These results indicate Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue
Overlap networks have the expected effect on Influence citations, regardless of the model
specification or estimation technique. Models (2), (3), (4), (8), (9), and (10) show that
Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap have the expected effect when they are
included alone, thus demonstrating that multicollinearity among these networks is not causing
these parameters to be falsely significant. Models (5), (6), and (11) establish that
multicollinearity does not prevent any of these parameters from being significant. Comparison
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of the results from Models (2) through (6) with the results from Model (8) through (11) reveals
that these results are not an artifact of the ERGM methodology, as the same pattern obtains
when MRQAP is implemented.4
The comparison between Models (5) and (6) is set up to determine the effects of
including indegree and outdegree endogenous parameters in the model. These parameters
matter importantly for the interpretation of the results. If the degree parameters are included
in the model, then the results should be interpreted as the effect of multiplex networks on the
likelihood of citing an interest group as influential, holding that interest group’s level of
influence constant. Thus, this model explains why A cites B (as opposed to C) as influential, but
not B’s overall level of level of influence. In contrast, if the degree parameters are excluded
from the model, then the results should be interpreted as the effect of multiplex networks on
the likelihood of citing an interest group as influential, regardless of the interest group’s overall
reputed influence. The results reported in Models (5) and (6) indicate that multiplex networks
exert a positive, significant effect regardless of whether the degree parameters are included in
the model. Multiplexity helps to explain the pattern of influence citations regardless of
whether influence is given or explained by the model. Model (6), which includes the degree

4

I considered the possibility that the significant coefficients on the parameters for the Communication,
Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap networks may depend, in part, on the edge values. Thus, I experimented with
a variety of models that relied on dichotomous, rather than valued, edges. These models included: (1)
Communication takes the value of 1 only if the edge value is greater than 0; (2) Communication takes the value of 1
only if the edge value is greater than 1; (3) Coalition Overlap takes the value of 1 only if the edge value is greater
than 0; (4) Coalition Overlap takes the value of 1 only if the edge value is greater than 1; (5) Coalition Overlap takes
the value of 1 only if the edge value is greater than 2; (6) Issue Overlap takes the value of 1 only if the edge value is
greater than 0; (7) Issue Overlap takes the value of 1 only if the edge value is greater than 1; and (8) Issue Overlap
takes the value of 1 only if the edge value is greater than 2. Variation in these models suggests that the
incremental effects of additional ties is not likely to be linearly increasing; for example, moving from zero to one tie
had a greater marginal effect than moving from one to two ties. However, variations in model specification did not
affect the direction or statistical significance of the parameters in the multiplex networks.
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parameters, is preferred to Model (5) because of its substantially lower BIC. Model (6) offers a
much better fit than Model (5).
The control variables included to account for homophily exhibit variation in their
statistical significance. Same Organizational Type is positive and significant in all of the ERGM‐
estimated models, except Model (5), but is not significant in any of MRQAP‐estimated models.
Similar Partisan Ties is negative and significant in all of the MRQAP‐estimated models, but not
in the ERGM‐estimated models, except Model (5). Similar Lobbying Activity is positive and
significant in every model except Model (2), suggesting that interest groups cite one another as
influential when they both register high levels of lobbying activity. Both Have PAC is negative
and significant in Models (1) and (6), positive and significant in Model (5), and insignificant in all
other models. Both Make Independent Expenditures is positive and significant only in Models
(5), (7), (9), (10), and (11). Both Have Downtown Office is positive and significant in Models (5),
(7), (9), (10), and (11). Variation in the significance of these parameters is likely due to
differences among the models in the inclusion or exclusion of endogenous parameters.
Because of this variation, it is unwise to draw conclusions about how homophily matters in the
allocation of influence citation patterns. Nonetheless, the results establish that the coefficients
on the multiplexity parameters are robust to the inclusion of variables intended to account for
homophily. Thus, homophily as an alternative explanation for citation patterns does not
undermine the validity of the multiplex theory.
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8. Discussion
Political actors pay close attention to influence reputation, in part, because actual
influence is so difficult to observe unambiguously. Reputation is a useful clue to actual
influence. Yet it is a clue that is socially constructed. Studies that have examined influence
reputation in the policy process have tended to ignore its socially constructed dimension (e.g.,
Fernandez and Gould, 1994; Heaney, 2006; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; but see Wolfinger, 1960
for an insightful, though widely ignored, critique). These studies model reputation as an
attribute possessed by actors, rather than as the product of the relations that they have with
others in a political network. An important reason for this oversight may have been the
absence of workable statistical methods to model the network properties of reputation within
an explanatory framework. The rise of the ERGM and MRQAP approaches, however, opens the
door to remedying this longstanding deficit in the influence reputation literature.
If reputation is essentially an attribute of an actor, then opinions about an actor’s
reputation should be distributed evenly throughout a network. That is, the probability that any
one actor cites another as influential should be strictly a function of the actor’s influence level
and other structural properties of the network. However, this study documents that that
influence reputation has a “local” quality ignored by typical studies on interest group politics.
As local actors observe their alters playing a variety of roles in the policy process – as
confidants, collaborators, and issue advocates – it reduces their uncertainty about which actors
truly matter in making policy and which do not. Thus, it is essential to understand the multiplex
networks in which interest groups participate to distill their involvement and influence in the
policy process.
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The results of the statistical analysis establish that each of the multiple roles identified
in this article are independently significant predictors that an ego cites an alter as influential. At
the same time, the results establish that all three networks together matter: When an ego is
tied with an alter in all three networks, the probability that ego cites alter as influential is higher
than if ego and alter are tied in fewer than all three networks. These findings support the
argument that as networks become increasingly multiplex, uncertainty about influence is
reduced. Each of the roles that interest groups play – as confidants, collaborators, and issue
advocates – are relevant to how their performance is evaluated by their peers. At the same
time, the role of confident – played in the communication network – stands out in every model
(in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6) as having the strongest relationship with influence reputation. Thus,
while interest groups affect their reputations in all the roles they play, the role of confident is
the most reliable and robust way for them to set the tone for how others see their influence
potential.
For the purpose of illustration, consider one concrete example from the data of how the
multiple roles serve interest groups in practice. The Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC) built a local reputation for influence by leveraging its roles in multiplex networks.
AAMC sought to have a major influence on health policy, though it lacked the extensive
resources of leading organizations, such as the American Medical Association (AMA), the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), and AARP (formerly the
American Association of Retired Persons). In particular, it sought to influence policies affecting
the funding of medical research, especially through research conducted by, and grants provided
through, the National Institutes of Health (NIH). To this end, it joined 17 coalitions, well above
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the study’s average of 7.911 coalitions per group. In many of these coalitions, such as the Ad
Hoc Group for Medical Research, AAMC served as the coalition’s convener and sponsor.
By joining and leading multiple coalitions, AAMC became known in the health policy
community as a leader and a contributor to public goods. Lobbyists who monitored issues
related to medical research were especially well positioned to observe AAMC playing
collaborator roles by coordinating coalition activity, ameliorating conflict between contending
interests, and representing the medical research community to the broader health field.
AAMC’s coalition work compensated for its weaker presence in Communication networks and
Issue Overlap networks – at least in comparison with leading actors such as AMA, PhRMA, and
AARP. By leveraging its position in multiple networks, AAMC was credited by many advocates
with helping to dramatically expand the NIH budget. It was cited as an influential organization
by 48 of the 167 other interest group representatives that I interviewed. This count did not
place it in the top handful of interest groups in the health policy domain, but it did earn well
above the network average of 20.429 citations.
Despite the strength of the results reported in the previous section, it also essential to
recognize the limitations of the present study. The social processes behind the formation of
influence reputation may be more complex than is reflected in the models estimated in this
article. First, the four networks examined in this article reflect only a few of the myriad types of
ties that connect interest groups to one another. Additionally, interest groups and their
representatives are connected though participation in the campaign finance system,
relationships established during previous coalitions or spells of prior employment, alumni ties,
and more. These networks reflect other critical roles played by interest group representatives.
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The analysis reported in this article demonstrates that multiplex networks matter, but does not
establish conclusively that the networks identified in this research are the only networks that
matter. Given this limitation, investigation into other sources of multiplexity is an important
direction for future research.
Second, the need to define the boundaries of the network in a manageable way
restricted the scope of this investigation to 168 interest groups in health policy. While such
boundary specification is essential to conduct network analysis, the real world of public policy is
not artificially constrained according to narrowly defined policy areas. Domains of policy may
overlap and intersect in ways that are not reflected in this research. Also, multiplexity may
work differently in a highly complex policy domain, such as health policy, than it does in a less
extensive and simpler domain, such as transportation. This research establishes that
multiplexity matters under at least some important circumstances. Yet it may not matter under
other circumstances. Given these concerns, future studies should investigate the effects of
networks that overlap policy domains and how multiplex networks may vary in their
consequences from domain to domain.
Finally, it is possible that the direction of causality flows, in part, in the opposite
direction of what is posited in this article. The models estimated here assume that interest
groups form ties in the Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap networks and,
subsequently, their representatives use these networks to develop understandings of influence
that lead them to cite groups in the Influence network. It is quite plausible, however, that the
process works, in part, in the reverse order. If an interest group representative begins to think
of another interest group that it is not connected with as influential, then it may decide to
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reach out to that group to establish a connection. For example, if Actor A believes that Actor B
is an influential interest group, then A may seek to attract B as a coalition partner in order to
make A’s coalitions more powerful. Of course, there are limits on A’s ability to attract B. B may
not wish to work on A’s issue. Or, B may believe that, as a reputedly influential actor, it can
achieve more by lobbying alone than by joining a coalition with A (Hojnacki, 1997).
Nonetheless, A may, on occasion, successfully form ties with B as a result of A’s initial
perception that B is influential. To the extent that such dynamics are present in the health
policy domain, then the statistical results reported here may overestimate the effects of
multiplex networks on influence, since part of what is being observed is the effect of influence
on multiplex networks.
The good news is that the results of the models estimated in this article suggest that the
endogenous effects of Influence on Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap are
not severe. I estimated models both with and without endogenous parameters for influence
level (i.e., indegree and outdegree). The fact that the three exogenous networks maintain their
significance and positive direction regardless of whether indegree and outdegree are in the
model suggests that conclusions about these parameters are robust to potential endogenous
effects of influence on network structures. However, such a conclusion assumes that influence
reputation develops on a global basis, rather than a local basis, as is posited in this article.
Thus, in order to reach a firm conclusion on this question, it would be necessary to collect and
analyze longitudinal data on influence reputation, as questions of causality in networks are
always problematic when dealing with cross‐sectional data (Fowler et al., 2011). Such an
approach would facilitate analysis of how reputations change over time and how those changes
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correspond (or not) with changes in network structure. A dynamic model, along these lines,
would be consistent with the theoretical perspective advanced in this article, that influence
reputations are socially constructed through interaction in multiple networks.

9. Conclusion
The theory of multiplex networks and influence reputation advanced in this article
offers a unified perspective on how interest groups leverage networks to make sense of
influence in the policy process. Previous research on interest group politics stresses the
importance of networks, but has tended to focus only on one aspect of networks. Past studies
examining interest group networks explore the role of communication (e.g., Carpenter et al.,
2003, 2004), coalitions (e.g., Hojnacki, 1997, 1998), and issues (e.g., Browne, 1990), but they
look at these types of networks in isolation from one another, rather than in combination with
one another. A multiplex analysis explicitly allows for the possibility that networks interact in
ways that matter for interest group behavior.
Analysis of how interest group representatives confide in one another reveals that
policy networks are densely interconnected with one another, yet offers little insight on how
interest group representatives weigh some connections more or less than others. Analysis of
coalitions alone is useful when interest groups formally collaborate, but fails to offer insight on
the behavior of interest groups that avoid formal coalitions. Analysis of issue involvement
alone is revealing when interest groups carve unambiguous issue niches, but is incomplete
when groups lobby outside their issue niches and play broader roles as issue advocates.
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In contrast, a multiplex analysis of networks models the fact that groups that avoid
formal coalitions may compensate by relying on a few close confidants. Groups may venture
outside their issue niches because they are pressured by their collaborators to change the ways
that they perform their roles as issue advocates. Even though adversaries may not
communicate with one another directly, issue advocacy may require them to monitor one
another’s activities closely through overlapping issue networks. Interest groups that are unable
to move to the center of any one type of network may be able to leverage the redundancies of
multiple, overlapping networks to interpret noisy signals and craft reputations for influence.
Given the overwhelming complexity of the world of public policy making, reliance on
multiplex networks is essential for interest group representatives to evaluate information that
is often conflicting, ambiguous, or uncertain. This article lays the foundation for future work on
interest group politics that takes into account the dependencies between communication,
coalitions, and issues in understanding how interest groups manage the uncertainties of their
local political environments and craft strategic responses to them. Drawing on information
gleaned from multiplex networks affords groups with greater opportunities bridge structural
holes in their networks (Burt, 1992) than they have when relying on information flowing
through a single network.
The consequences of multiplexity are likely to be much different in predicting the
strategic actions of interest groups than of evaluating interest group influence. Interest groups
may be able to exploit their position between networks to amplify uncertainty on the part of
their competitors in order to outflank them in the quest for influence. For example, Heaney
and Lorenz (2012: 28) document precisely this strategic behavior on the part of AARP in its
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successful efforts to influence the enactment and implementation of the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003. Clearly, a careful application of multiplexity theory requires the
analyst to be sensitive to differences in the strategic uses of networks in understanding their
use and value to interest groups.
While the analysis reported here speaks directly to questions in interest group politics, it
can also be generalized, to some extent, in thinking about other political systems. While
networks of communication, coalitions, and issues are of specific concern to interest group
scholars, other kinds of multiplex networks may matter in other aspects of the policy process.
For example, bureaucrats at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or other government
agencies may rely heavily upon advice networks that provide them information about technical
decisions (Carpenter 2010). The FDA’s multiplex networks may include connections with other
bureaucrats, scientific experts, academics, and policy advocates. While the exact model
developed in this article would not apply in these cases, an analogous approach may be useful
in studies of influence reputation in institutions such as the European Parliament, the United
Nations, and associations of nongovernmental organizations.
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Table 1. Network Descriptions
Network

Definition, Interview Question, and Data Sources

Influence

Definition: If A cites B as influential, then the edge takes the value of 1, otherwise 0.
Interview Question: As I have indicated, all of the organizations on this list are very
active in the national health policy area. But I would now like you to circle the
codes of those organizations which stand out as especially influential in formulating
national health care policy.
Data Source: Author interviews with 168 interest group representatives in
Washington, DC, conducted in 2003.

Communication

Definition: If A cites B as a partner for “occasional meetings and other
communications,” then the edge takes the value of 1; If A cites B as a partner for
“regular meetings and other communications, then the edge takes the value of 2;
otherwise the edge takes the value of 0.
Interview Question: Please look at the list of interest groups in Card C. Please
indicate the nature of your relationship with each group on health care issues
during the 107th and 108th Congresses. Do you have: Occasional meetings and
other communications; Regular meetings and other communications.
Data Source: Author interviews with 168 interest group representatives in
Washington, DC, conducted in 2003.

Coalition Overlap

Definition: The edge between A and B takes the value of the number of health care
coalitions that the two interest groups had in common during the 107th and 108th
Congress.
Interview Question: Please look at the list of coalitions in Card B. For each of these
coalitions, please indicate whether your organization has been a member of this
coalition in the past or is currently a member of the coalition. If your organization
has never been a member of this coalition, please leave this part blank. If there are
any other health‐related coalitions of which your organization is a member, please
indicate this under “other coalitions.”
Data Sources: Author interviews with 168 interest group representatives in
Washington, DC, conducted in 2003. Organizational membership lists provided by
coalition leaders. The network data were generated from the actual membership
lists, rather than the responses to the interview question. The initial list of 77
coalitions was generated from interviews with 95 congressional staff members
working on health policy issues
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Table 1 Continued. Network Descriptions
Issue Overlap

Definition: The edge between A and B takes the value of the number of health care
issues that the two interest groups had in common during the 107th and 108th
Congress, based on a designation of those issues as “major” by the respondents.
Interview Question: Please look at the list of health care issues in Card A. For each
issue, can you tell me, was this issue a major or a minor priority for your
organization during the 107th and 108th Congresses?
Data Sources: Author interviews with 168 interest group representatives in
Washington, DC, conducted in 2003. The initial list of 40 issues was generated from
the census of articles appearing in CQ Weekly, 2001‐2002.
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Table 2. Network Properties
Network Property

Influence

Communication

Coalition
Overlap

Issue Overlap

Directionality

Directed

Directed

Undirected

Undirected

Edge Values

Binary

Valued

Valued

Valued

Node Count

168

168

168

168

Edge Count

3,384

5,142

9,118

21,234

Mean Degree

20.429

30.869

55.173

127.357

Degree Standard Deviation

26.172

26.704

34.525

35.852

Mean Edge Value

0.121

0.265

0.709

2.573

Edge Value Standard Deviation

0.326

0.599

1.409

2.527

Density

0.121

0.183

0.325

0.757

Centralization (betweenness)

0.113

0.043

0.016

0.002

Connectedness

0.953

1.000

0.807

0.930

Reciprocity

0.791

0.830

N/A

N/A

Transitivity

0.456

0.409

0.677

0.878

Estimation was conducted using the statnet package in R (Goodreau et al., 2008). Reciprocity is not
calculated for the Coalition Overlap and Issue Overlap networks because, as undirected affiliation
networks, they have perfect reciprocity by definition.
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Table 3. Network Correlations

Influence

Communication

Coalition Overlap

Issue Overlap

0.140***

0.092***

0.127***

0.367***

0.303***

Communication
Coalition Overlap

0.288***

*** p≤0.001; **p≤0.010; *p≤0.050.
The Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) was used to generate correlations and tests of statistical
significance (Krackhardt, 1987). Estimation was performed in UCINet 6.289 (Borgatti et al., 2011).
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Table 4. Concordance in Citations across Networks
Then also tied in…
1. Bivariate Concordance

Influence

Communication

Coalition
Overlap

Issue
Overlap

0.322***

0.440***

0.837***

0.605***

0.898***

Influence
If tied in…

Communication

0.210***

Coalition Overlap

0.163***

0.344***

Issue Overlap

0.133***

0.219***

0.877***
0.376***

Then also tied in…
2. Higher‐Order Concordance

If tied in…

Influence

Communication and Coalition Overlap

0.231***

Communication and Issue Overlap

0.223***

Coalition Overlap and Issue Overlap

0.175***

Communication, Coalition Overlap, and Issue Overlap

0.237***

*** p≤0.001; **p≤0.010; *p≤0.050.
Table entries are the conditional probably of being tied in the network listed in the column given that an
interest group dyad is tied in the network listed in the row. Statistical significance was determined using
a standard t test.

55

Table 5. Exponential Random Graph Models for Influence Network
Baseline
Model
(1)
Exogenous Parameters
Communication Network

Coalition Overlap Network

Issue Overlap Network

Same Organizational Type

Similar Partisan Ties

Similar Lobbying activity

Both Have PAC

Both Make Independent Expenditures

Both Have Downtown Office

0.261***
(0.054)
[0.015]
0.022
(0.045)
(0.008)
0.278***
(0.083)
[0.003]
‐0.125*
(0.060)
[0.002]
‐0.034
(0.191)
[0.007]
0.084
(0.046)
[0.002]

Baseline Plus One Network Model
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Coefficient / (Standard Error) / [MCMC Standard Error]
0.331***
0.369***
(0.032)
(0.028)
[0.006]
[0.001]
0.103***
0.031**
(0.013)
(0.012)
[0.001]
[0.000]
0.063***
0.067***
(0.006)
(0.005)
[0.000]
[0.000]
0.226***
0.206***
0.300***
0.004
(0.055)
(0.054)
(0.054)
(0.044)
[0.011]
[0.012]
[0.012]
[0.000]
‐0.045
0.037
0.021
‐0.377***
(0.046)
(0.045)
(0.046)
(0.039)
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.003]
[0.000]
0.181*
0.294***
0.305***
0.807***
(0.081)
(0.082)
(0.082)
(0.059)
[0.002]
[0.003]
[0.003]
[0.000]
‐0.060
‐0.080
‐0.115
0.110***
(0.059)
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.016)
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.000]
‐0.176
0.010
‐0.318
0.752***
(0.192)
(0.192)
(0.180)
(0.062)
[0.004]
[0.003]
[0.003]
[0.000]
0.066
0.035
0.081
0.403***
(0.044)
(0.043)
(0.042)
(0.013)
[0.002]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.000]

Table 5 Continued on Next Page
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Multiplex
Full Model
(6)
0.255***
(0.037)
[0.007]
0.053***
(0.015)
[0.001]
0.035***
(0.007)
[0.000]
0.183***
(0.055)
[0.002]
0.035
(0.047)
[0.001]
0.250**
(0.079)
[0.002]
‐0.068**
(0.022)
[0.000]
‐0.125
(0.075)
[0.000]
0.012
(0.015)
[0.000]

Table 5 Continued. Exponential Random Graph Models for Influence Network
Endogenous Parameters
Edges

One Edgewise Shared Partner

Two Edgewise Shared Partners

Influence Indegree of A

Influence Outdegree of A

N (dyads)
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Samples
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)

‐5.129***
(0.008)
[0.000]
‐0.197***
(0.0334)
[0.000]
‐0.153***
(0.021)
[0.000]
0.047***
(0.001)
[0.000]
0.064***
0.000
[0.000]
28,056
1,000,000
13,479
13,570

‐5.187***
(0.010)
[0.000]
‐0.184***
(0.030)
[0.000]
‐0.145***
(0.024)
[0.000]
0.047***
(0.000)
[0.000]
0.065***
(0.000)
[0.000]
28,056
1,000,000
13,380
13,479

*** p≤0.001; **p≤0.010; *p≤0.050.
Estimation was conducted using the ergm package in R (Hunter, Handcock, et al., 2008).
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‐5.187***
(0.008)
[0.000]
‐0.190***
(0.033)
[0.000]
0.146***
(0.020)
[0.000]
0.047***
(0.000)
[0.000]
0.065***
(0.000)
[0.000]
28,056
1,000,000
13,429
13,528

‐5.271***
(0.009)
[0.000]
‐0.184***
(0.030)
[0.000]
‐0.146***
(0.023)
(0.000)
0.047***
(0.000)
[0.000]
0.064***
(0.000)
[0.000]
28,056
1,000,000
13,431
13,529

‐2.495***
(0.006)
[0.000]
‐0.288***
(0.061)
[0.000]
‐0.316***
(0.062)
[0.000]

28,056
1,000,000
19,102
19,201

‐5.281***
(0.009)
[0.000]
‐0.162***
(0.026)
[0.000]
‐0.137***
(0.023)
[0.000]
0.046***
(0.000)
[0.000]
0.064***
(0.000)
[0.000]
28,056
1,000,000
13,355
13,471

Table 6. Double Semi‐Partialing Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure for Influence Network
Homophily
Only Model
(7)
Communication Network
Coalition Overlap Network
Issue Overlap Network
Same Organizational Type
Similar Partisan Ties
Similar Lobbying activity
Both Have PAC
Both Make Independent Expenditures
Both Have Downtown Office
Intercept
N (dyads)
Number of Permutations
Adjusted R2

0.016
(0.008)
‐0.061***
(0.010)
0.102***
(0.024)
0.023
(0.018)
0.063***
(0.041)
0.069**
(0.018)
0.000
(0.000)
28,056
2,000
0.031

*** p≤0.001; **p≤0.010; *p≤0.050.
Estimation was performed in UCINet 6.289 (Borgatti et al., 2011).
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Homophily Plus One Network Model
(8)
(9)
(10)
Standardized Coefficient / (Standard Error)
0.162***
(0.025)
0.082***
(0.012)
0.063***
(0.014)
0.022
0.008
0.013
(0.019)
(0.008)
(0.008)
‐0.050*
‐0.062***
‐0.058***
(0.025)
(0.010)
(0.010)
‐0.037
0.101***
0.103***
(0.060)
(0.024)
(0.024)
0.008
0.024
0.022
(0.047)
(0.018)
(0.018)
0.029
0.060***
0.060***
(0.100)
(0.041)
(0.041)
0.014
0.062**
0.068**
(0.029)
(0.017)
(0.017)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
28,056
28,056
28,056
2,000
2,000
2,000
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Figure 1. Influence Network
A. Complete Influence Network

B. Influence Citations to a Leading Actor

C. Influence Citations to an Actor with a Local Reputation
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Figure 2. Uniplex and Multiplex Networks for Random Sample of 25 Nodes
A. Influence Network

B. Communication Network

C. Influence and Communication Networks Combined

Red lines denote influence citations. Blue lines denote communication citations. Black lines denote
both influence and communication
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Figure 3. Goodness of Fit for the Multiplex Full Model
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